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This paper aims to examine how the law and cultural mores worked together to create 
and sustain racial slavery in America.  Notably, there was a duality to both the law and culture of 
America that was undeniably present at the time of its founding and persists in many ways today. 
With respect to the law, there was a duality to how it applied, who it applied to, how it was 
interpreted, and how it was weaponized. Concerning culture, there was a duality to how social 
rules applied akin to the duality noted in the law, and a multiplicity of prevailing cultural values 
and beliefs relating to slavery and race. More significantly though, there was a duality to what 
America represented and what it meant to be an American. There was, on the one hand, the idea 
of a free America with all the privileges, rights and liberties promised to its citizens by the 
Constitution. On the other, there was the idea of an oppressive America that provided little 
opportunity, a constant threat of enslavement, and none of the protections of freedom and 
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. The most important thing to note about duality, however, 
is that it refers to two sides of the same thing, not two distinct things. There was—and still is—
unmistakably a duality to American culture and law as this paper will demonstrate, but this is not 
a paper about two separate stories of America’s legal history. To be clear, America’s legal history 
is one story. The story has multiple chapters, so to speak, but they are all in the same book. The 
book is full of contradictions, hypocrisies, disparate treatment, and double standards. It has many 
heroes and villains, martyrs and murderers, utterly reproachable moments and moments beyond 
reproach, but they are all part of the same story. The story of America is inextricable from the 
experiences of Black Americans. That is, the tribulations and triumphs of Black Americans must 
be told as part of the American story. This paper seeks to capture the chapter of slavery within 
that story as honestly as possible. 
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 The discussion will begin with an analysis on the origins of racial slavery in colonial 
America. That analysis will emphasize the insidious function of the law and preconceptions about 
African culture and race in what Winthrop Jordan dubbed “the process of debasement.”1 After 
exploring the forces responsible for the creation of racial slavery in colonial America, the focus 
will turn to the role of Southern law and culture in sustaining the hegemonic structure of 
Southern society that allowed for slavery’s continued survival. With the role of Southern law and 
culture put properly in their place, the focus will turn to federal law by examining how the 
nation’s highest institutions allowed slavery to survive the birth of a “free” republic.” The part 
that the framers and the Constitution of 1787 played in the story of American slavery will be first 
considered in the context of Frederick Douglass’s arguments related to whether the Constitution 
was pro-slavery or anti-slavery. Next, it will be argued that the Court rendered the Constitution 
undeniably pro-slavery through two racially-driven decisions made under the pretense of legal 
formalism: Prigg and Dred Scott.2 Congress’s role will be discussed in conjunction with the Dred 
Scott case. Finally, the paper will close with a brief comment on the implications of this sinister 
part of American history on life in today’s America.  
Origins of Racial Slavery: The Law and Cultural Bias in Colonial America  
Whether owed to bad intent or lack of foresight, the law played an unfortunate role in 
creating a society in which racial slavery could thrive. Though, the law did not operate in a 
vacuum: prevailing prejudices about African sexuality and culture, preconceptions surrounding 
blackness and whiteness, and the fears and anxieties of the English settlers all played integral 
roles in the ultimate creation of racial slavery in the American South. In the mid to late 
 
1 WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 45 (1974). 
2 Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
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seventeenth century, the law and cultural biases effectively debased African Americans and 
created a clear and palpable distinction in the way White and Black people living in America were 
treated and perceived by the public and the legal system. This section will examine this cultural 
“process of debasement”3 and argue that it created a firm foundation for racial slavery in 
America. The efficacy of the clearly repugnant institution was entirely dependent on the public 
seeing the oppressed class as fundamentally different and inferior. Southern society would have 
rejected slavery as repulsive if it saw African-Americans as being equal and deserving of personal 
dignity and autonomy. It is therefore unlikely that racial slavery would have survived without this 
process of cultural debasement that played on social prejudices to establish laws that 
distinguished between the races. In this light, the reproachable impact the law had on this 
process begins to look more like a product of bad intent than lack of foresight.  
The economic conditions of the South and the Country’s dependence on the Southern 
economy were also of incredible significance to the story of slavery. The massive amounts of land 
required large-scale, unskilled, and cheap labor to fuel the Tobacco and Cotton industries among 
others.4 This demand for labor undoubtedly had a hand in the ultimate creation and maintenance 
of slavery in America, but the need for labor does not explain why America’s iteration of  slavery 
was racially driven and predicated on anti-Black prejudice. This “proses of debasement” in which 
the law and culture subjugated and debased African people immediately upon their first arrival 
in North America better explains the origins of racial slavery in America.  
 
3 WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 45 (1974). 
4 See e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE LAW OF SLAVERY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, in SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 
11-18 (“The cotton economy of the early republic also supported a hierarchical social system , with plantation owners 
superior to ordinary farmers and farmers superior to slaves. Reconciling such a social system with democratic 
presuppositions that pervaded the nation, including the slave South, could be most easily accomplished by reinforcing 
the racist dimensions of Southern slavery: Farmers could think that they were equal to planters, at least politically, 
while both were superior to the enslaved blacks.”).  
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The origins of anti-Black prejudice can be traced back well before the days of slavery. The 
prevailing concepts of blackness and whiteness—apart from race—in English and colonial 
American society before the Englishmen and Africans first interacted are quite revealing. 
Blackness was associated with impurity, darkness and evil. It was considered dirty and filthy, foul 
and wicked, repulsive and reproachable. In contrast, whiteness was associated with purity and 
virginity, cleanliness and beauty, virtue and righteousness.5 Consequently, upon meeting 
Africans, the English were flooded with bewilderment and immediate prejudices based simply on 
the color of the Africans’ skin.6 Cultural differences would only serve to exacerbate this sense of 
otherness felt toward Africans by the English, but it was unmistakably the color of the Africans’ 
skin that made them an immediate target for persecution and oppression by the xenophobic 
colonists.7 This is arguably evidenced by the difference in the way the colonists treated Native 
Americans and Africans. Of course, the colonists committed horrific atrocities against the Native 
tribes, but they also saw them as a people worth assimilating into American culture.8  Africans, 
on the other hand, were only seen as having potential for free labor.  Part of this was likely due 
to the social context in which the colonists encountered the two groups of peoples.9 The Native 
Americans knowledge of the landscape and its military capacity, for example, made enslaving 
them a steep battle.10  Similarly, the cultural differences must have played some role. The 
colonists had some respect and reverence for the Native American way of life, they saw them as 
having nations and statehood, a sense of community and national or tribal pride.  In contrast, 
they saw the Africans as being stateless and without religion, laws, hierarchy, or a sense of 
 
5 WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 6 (1974).  
6 Id. at 4.  
7 Id. at 6.  
8 Id. at 12.  
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
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community and nationalism.11 Africa was one monolithic stateless land mass in the eyes of the 
English colonists.12 Yet, to be clear, both Native Americans and Africans were looked at as inferior 
and savage heathens by the colonists. The ultimate difference with respect to slavery and 
assimilation, however, seems to come down to skin color.  The colonists could not separate what 
they considered to be the Africans’  “savagery” and heathenism from the Africans’ black skin 
tone.13 In fact, the Africans’ perceived heathenism and “savagery” was often viewed by the 
English as linked to their blackness.14 To that end, there were some who viewed blackness in man 
as the consequence of a biblical curse, God’s Curse on Ham.15 Perhaps this difference in 
treatment is due to those preconceptions of blackness that date back centuries. Alternatively, 
maybe it is because the English had encountered peoples somewhat similar in complexion to the 
Native Americans, such as the Moors, but they had never encountered any group of people with 
dark skin tones like those of people from Central and West Africa.16 Either way, it is clear that it 
was the African’s blackness that made the English view him as fundamentally different from both 
White people and Native Americans. Further, it was the African’s blackness that the colonists saw 
as presenting a practical advantage in that it was a permanent and readily identifiable mark.17 
 That is not to say that religion, notions of “savagery,” and preconceptions about African 
sex and culture were insignificant. To the contrary, those differences only made the English view 
their disparate treatment of the Africans as justified. For the English, the Africans’ presumed 
godlessness and incivility—taken in combination with the color of their skin—made them a 
 
11 Id. at 13.  
12 Id. at 12-14.  
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 13.  
15 Id. at 9.  
16 Id.  
17 M 
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fundamentally different type of person.18 Everything presumed about African culture was 
reproachable to English colonial eyes merely because of how fundamentally different it was 
presumed to be: their dress, their appearance, their religion, their language, their sexuality. Most 
disturbingly, the English would label Africans as animalistic and beastly. “They knew perfectly 
well that [Africans] were men, yet they frequently described the Africans as ‘brutish’ or ‘beastial’ 
or ‘beastly.’”19 For example, the English frequently compared the Africans to apes and fabricated 
stories detailing absurd interactions between apes and African people.20 A particularly disgraceful 
iteration of these baseless prejudices was the persistent defamatory claim that African women 
and apes had sexual relations.21 Similarly, African male sexuality was arbitrarily depicted as 
aggressively libidinous and rapacious.22 Though, arguably more important than the actual 
prejudices may have been the colonists’ own insecurities underlying these prejudices. Many of 
their preconceptions about African culture were ultimately projections of their own insecurities 
and anxieties. Most importantly, the colonists had a massive fear of becoming uncivilized. They 
were in the new world which necessitated an inherently rugged and remote lifestyle in its early 
days. As such, the colonists had a desire to establish their version of civility: law and hierarchical 
order. What is worse, they overreacted to anything they found contrary to their own conceptions 
of civility.23 As academically interested in the concept of savagery as they may have been, they 
were more so repulsed and terrified by the idea of becoming savage themselves.  
The fears and insecurities of the early played out in the context of interracial sex and the law 
as well. As mentioned, there was a presumption by many white Englishmen in the American 
 
18 Id. at 13.  
19 Id. at 14.  
20 Id. at 15.  
21 Id. at 17.  
22 Id. at 18-20. 
23 Id. at 12-15.  
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colonies that Africans were particularly libidinous and promiscuous. Many of these 
preconceptions, which included the idea that Black men lusted White women, could be 
characterized as the English colonists projecting anxieties about their own primal instincts and 
desires unto the African population out of insecurity. This included, of course, anxieties about 
their own sexual inadequacy. Whatever the cause, there was a clear ambivalence—a tension 
between “desire” and “aversion”—about interracial sex held by the White population that Jordan 
attributes to a deeper, more fundamental dilemma of the day.24 That is, White people saw Black 
people as both similar to and different from themselves, and White people feared both sides of 
that reality.25     
Laws prohibiting and punishing interracial sex and marriage served to reinforce these 
prejudice notions about sexuality and race. The same could be said of laws that deemed the 
offspring of interracial unions illegitimate,26 and those that classified biracial people as Black, not 
White or biracial.27 These laws effectively enlarged the barrier distinguishing White people from 
Black people in the eyes of the public which, again, was an integral part of how racial slavery was 
able to survive and thrive in the South. In a similar, although arguably more damaging, vein, there 
were also laws that significantly distinguished between the races for the purposes of labor and 
service.  
Specifically, there were two kinds of labor laws enacted before chattel slavery was in full 
swing that are particularly jarring with respect to how directly they reinforced the institution in 
the Southern colonies. First, there was a declaration by colonial Maryland in 1664 that Black 
servants were to serve “Durante Vita,” for life, which was followed by similar declarations in 
 
24Id. at 70. 
25Id.  
26 Id. at 71.  
27 Id. at 84.  
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many other Southern colonies soon after.28 Second, there were various state laws allowing Black 
women to be used as field laborers.29 Unsurprisingly, White women could not be used for such 
strenuous labor. Although slavery had already taken root in some southern colonies, this man-
made legal distinction between the races is what allowed racial slavery to thrive in a society that 
paradoxically prided itself on freedom. Most significantly, the laws made it such that owning a 
Black servant (which quickly became “slave”) was more valuable than having a White servant.30 
A Black servant was a slave, the chattel of his master, and he would be such for his life. Worse 
still, his kids would be born slaves. In stark contrast, a White servant was not personal property, 
he would not be bound for life, and his kids were born free. Moreover, since a Black female 
servant could be used for much more difficult labor than her White counterpart, her service was 
inherently more valuable.  
As the laws requiring Black servants to serve for life took effect, slavery soon surpassed 
indentured servitude. Again, indentured servitude was for White people of a certain lower class, 
but chattel slavery was reserved for Americans of African descent and occasionally Native 
Americans. Though, the process of debasement did not limit itself to slaves, it was directed at all 
African Americans. For example, there were laws barring free Black men from testifying against 
White men; laws allowing slaves to testify against free Black men, but prohibiting slaves from 
testifying against White men; and references to free Black men in the Southern colonies’ slave 
codes. Such laws were blatant attempts to encourage the public to associate free Black men with 
enslaved Black men rather than with free White men. This continued an all too familiar theme: 
make the slaves, and African Americans more generally, appear to the public, and feel to 
 
28 Id. at 42-45. 
29 Id. at 43-44; 66.  
30 Id.  
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themselves, inferior and worthy of enslavement to justify the morality of the institution of racial 
slavery. As Frederick Douglass once put it,  “[b]y the laws of the country from whence I came, I 
was deprived of myself—of my own body, soul, and spirit.”31  
Regardless of whether cultural mores informed the law or the law informed cultural mores, 
it cannot be denied that the enactment of a law or a decision by a high court is an expression by 
the state that effectively formalizes a government’s position on a given matter. A law that 
prohibits interracial sex and distinguishes between White and Black people, for example, sends 
a clear message to the public that there is a fundamental difference between these two groups 
of people that requires the law to mandate different treatment. Further, a law that distinguishes 
between the races disproportionately to the detriment of Black people sends a clear message to 
the public that Black people are considered to have a subordinate and inferior role in that society. 
Whether the message is effectively ‘you were right to be prejudice’ and only reaffirms the already 
widely held cultural mores, or ‘you were wrong for not being prejudice’ and invites new 
prejudices is not entirely significant. Either way, the law was being used as a tool to affirm or 
reaffirm prejudice in a process which created and sustained cultural norms and social hierarchies 
based on those prejudices. This theme would continue virtually uninhibited throughout slavery’s 
existence and beyond, especially in the South where the slaveholding class’s hegemony was 
strongest.  
The Law as a Hegemonic Tool in the American South 
 
 
31 Frederick Douglass, My Experience and My Mission to Great Britain, 1 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS (eds. 
John W. Blassingame) (Yale Univ. Press 1979). 
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Looking at the law in the antebellum South as part of a larger cultural hegemony can tell us a 
great deal about the nature of Southern society. Most importantly though, it puts the role of law 
in its proper place as being the principle vehicle used to maintain the White slaveholders’ control 
of the American South.32  Black’s Law Dictionary defines hegemony as “(1) influence,  authority, 
or supremacy over others” and provides the example of “the hegemony of capitalism.”33 The 
slaveholding class’s control and dominance over the South is best described as a hegemony and 
Southern law during the era of slavery is best understood as a hegemonic device.  That is, once 
slavery was clearly established in the South, the law acted hegemonically to accommodate the 
institution and sustain the power hierarchy in place. It is at this stage where the law was most 
actively weaponized to reinforce the rights of slave owners, deter slave insurrection, and 
reaffirm—in the minds of slave owners and the White community at large—the sinister notion 
that the continued enslavement of African Americans was not only justified but in the public 
interest.  
One interpretation of the relationship between law and hegemony suggests that laws can 
be characterized as “attempts by their authors. . . to describe the social relations of their society 
in ways that reconciles those relations with the moral traditions widely available in that 
society.”34 As the argument goes, hegemony results when the law succeeds in this endeavor, 
“allowing the reproduction of existing social relations, because the social relations seem right, or 
at least defensible, to the audiences. . . .”35  Thus, there may be an “equally cause and effect” 
relationship between law and morals with respect to slavery.36 Many judicial decisions, state 
 
32 EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 26.   
33 “Hegemony,” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
34 Mark Tushnet, Review: Constructing Paternalist Hegemony: Gross, Johnson, and Hadden on Slaves and Masters, 
27 L. & SCIENCE INQUIRY 169, 173 (2002).  
35Id. at 173.  
36 WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 59 (1974). 
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statutes, and regulations have served to describe slavery in a way that reconciled it with 
society’s morals. Put differently, the law allowed for the continuation of slavery and the 
hegemony of White slaveholders by making slavery “seem right, or at least defensible,” to the 
majority of people living in the antebellum South.37  Significantly, the slaveholding class was 
ostensibly aware of its hegemony over the South. Thus, most laws coming out of state courts 
and state legislatures in the South could be characterized as tools intentionally used to maintain 
that hegemonic power imbalance.  
Consider, for instance, the opinion authored by Judge Ruffin on behalf of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court in the infamous 1829 case of State v. Mann.38 As Professor Mark Tushnet 
frames it, “[t]he case's content, its exposition of the logic of slavery, might best be understood as 
Ruffin's effort to establish, for the entire South, what slavery really required.”39  Tushnet rightly 
points out that Ruffin was attempting to establish the legal foundation that he felt slavery 
required. However, Tushnet and other scholars have been far too generous in deeming Ruffin’s 
stance on slavery ambivalent.40 It is shocking that abolitionists of the day had any positives to say 
about the ‘honesty’ of this opinion. Granted, it was honest about the horrors of slavery, but the 
opinion by Judge Ruffin as a whole is perhaps the most blatant and unsettling example of 
pretextual judicial conservatism and legal formalism by a high state court, crocodile tears and all. 
Ruffin presents an illusion of judicial restraint to excuse an unjust and poorly reasoned decision. 
Of course, Ruffin owned plenty of slaves. What is more, he spent a great deal of time and money 
as a slave trader, and he also faced claims of cruelty and harsh mistreatment of his own slaves.41 
 
37 Tushnet, supra note 34, at 173.  
38 State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829) 
39 MARK TUSHNET, STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE, in SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 85-96.   
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
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It is clear that his personal views on slavery crept into his jurisprudence despite all his appeals to 
the contrary.  The case dealt with the issue of whether “cruel and unreasonable battery on a 
slave, by the hirer, is indictable.”42 According to Judge Ruffin, it was not an indictable offense 
because the master had near absolute power over his slave as that is what the institution 
mandated.43 Ruffin’s rhetoric would lead one to belief that he was genuinely exercising judicial 
restraint and repudiated slavery in his personal capacity. Though, under closer examination it is 
clear that his decision was far from restrained. The jury in the lower court found Mann liable for 
cruelly beating his slave, yet Ruffin reversed and maintained the argument that the public would 
not approve had he ruled against Mann despite the public—through the jury—expressing just 
the opposite. Time and again, Ruffin suggested that although slavery ought not to be accepted 
morally, it was simply the way things were and he, as a judge, could not change that.44 In reality, 
however, Ruffin was doing exactly what Tushnet said he was. That is,  Ruffin was establishing the 
absolute superiority of the master and the absolute subordinacy of the slave because, as he 
openly admits, that is the hierarchical dynamic that the institution of slavery required to run 
effectively.45 
 
42 State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829) 
43  Id. at 266 (“Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else 
which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the 
slave perfect.”).  
44 Id.at 268 (“But being brought to it, the Court is compelled to declare, that while slavery exists amongst us in its 
present state, or until it shall seem fit to the Legislature to interpose express enactments to the contrary, it will be the 
imperative duty of the Judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the exercise 
of it is forbidden by statute.”). See also Id. at 266-67 (“I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this 
proposition, I feel it as deeply as any man can. And as a principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must 
repudiate it. But in the actual condition of things, it must be so. There is no remedy. This discipline belongs to the 
state of slavery. They cannot be disunited, without abrogating at once the rights of the master, and absolving the slave 
from his subjection.”). 
45 See e.g., Id. at 266 .(“With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the master, his security and the public 
safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the 
capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits.”). 
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  Like Judge Ruffin, many Southern courts and legislatures sought to solidify the 
relationship between slaves and slaveowners by reducing slaves to the legal status of property. 
In almost all of the South, slaves were treated as personal property under the law.46 In Louisiana, 
the one exception in the South, the slave was treated as real property.47 However, in states where 
the slave was treated as personal property generally, they were treated as real property for 
purposes of inheritance.48 Similarly, although treated primarily as real property in Louisiana, the 
slave “retained many characteristics of chattels personal.”49 In either case, the point remains the 
same: slaves were treated as property rather than as people. Slaves were given free will and the 
status of a person only when they were being held ‘accountable’ for ‘misconduct’:  
The paradox of the slave’s being at once person and property often disappeared 
when he or she committed a crime. In that instance the slave was almost 
invariably a person in the eyes of the law. By contrast, when a slave was victimized 
by an owner’s cruelty, Louisiana was far more cognizant of the slave as property. 
Thus, again, the legal system was rendered inadequate to protect slaves’ most 
basic rights. . . .50 
 
Although she was addressing specifically the Louisiana legal system, this quote from author Judith 
Schafer can be extended to most of the South. Take, for example, the trial of Celia, a slave who 
was hung by the state of Missouri in 1855 for the murder of Robert Newsom.51 Newsom, a 
widower in his late seventies, had bought Celia when she was only 14.52 For five years, Celia was 
sexually assaulted and raped by Robert Newsom which resulted in two children.53 At age 19, she 
was pregnant for a third time and the father was unknown as she had been romantically involved 
 
46 Kenneth Stampp, Chattels Personal, in The Peculiar Institution 192-236 (1964).  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Judith Kelleher Schafer, “Details are of a Most Revolting Character”: Cruelty to Slaves as Seen in Appeals to the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana, in SLAVERY & THE LAW 241-267. 
51 DeNeen L. Brown, Missouri v. Celia, A Slave: She Killed the White Master Raping Her, then Claimed Self-
Defense, WASH. POST (Oct. 19. 2017).  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
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with one of Newsom’s male slaves, George.54 At this point, Celia and George decided that 
Newsom’s abuse had to stop.  Celia warned Newsom that she would hurt him if he came to her 
cabin again, and she asked his adult daughters to keep him away. Of course, he did not oblige. 
When Newsom entered Celia’s cabin on June 23, 1855 and tried to force himself on her sexually, 
Celia cracked his head with a stick and killed him.55 She was subsequently arrested and charged 
with first degree murder. At trial, her attorney argued that she was acting in self-defense under 
Missouri law. Despite the obvious veracity of this legal argument, the court denied it and 
sentenced her to execution. The court attributed her free will for the killing of her master, but 
somehow held she simultaneously lacked the personal autonomy to protect herself against rape 
and sexual assault from her master. Celia was “hanged until she died” on December 21, 1855.56 
To be perfectly clear, “the cold language of statutes and judicial decisions made it evident 
that, legally, the slave was less a person than a thing.”57  It is quite revealing that slave masters 
got compensated for destruction of property when their slaves were injured, killed, or arrested 
for crimes.58 The unreported case of Humphreys v. Utz is illustrative of this point.59 In that case, 
Henry Utz, a grotesquely abusive overseer, was held liable for damages due to his vicious, cruel 
and sadistic beating and murder of a slave called Ginger Pop. Significantly, however, it was a tort 
action for destruction of property, not a criminal murder trial.60 Thus, Utz was not held liable for 
his disgusting murder of Ginger Pop; rather, he was held liable only for damaging the property of 
the plaintiff, Ginger Pop’s master.61 His only punishment for the brutal murder of another human 
 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57Kenneth Stampp, Chattels Personal, in The Peculiar Institution 192-236 (1964). 
58 Id.  
59 The Unreported Case of Humprheys v. Utz, Louisiana (1856). 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
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being was to pay damages, jail time was never in consideration.  Notably, the most silent parties 
on most slavery related court records in Southern states were the subjects of the suits 
themselves: the slaves.62 Of course, witnesses were almost always white and the jury would often 
be made up of landowning White men.63  Further, many of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors and 
judges in the Southern courts were active participants in slavery and owned or traded slaves.64 
The trial of Celia, the Humphreys case, and State v. Mann were certainly no exceptions to that.   
Although legally considered more property than man, the dual nature of African American 
slaves was something that Southern law undeniably accounted for—just not in the way one 
would have hoped. As Jordan put it, “[c]onsidered as men, slaves raised much more difficult 
problems. The most pressing necessity was maintenance of discipline: hence the famous slave 
codes.”65  Consequently, a large portion of the slave codes were statutes aimed at the 
punishment of runaway and malfeasant slaves, which included punishments like “a specific 
number of stripes ‘well laid on,’ all the way, occasionally, to burning at the stake.”66 The slave 
codes and other Southern state law also sought to provide an omnipresent, self-enforcing 
compliance mechanism, which was also essential to maintaining the slaveholding class’s 
hegemony over the South. The law achieved this by placing an obligation directly on slave owners 
to punish the misdeeds of their slaves and enforce the various provisions enumerated in a given 
state’s slave code.67 Though, even if unenforced, harsh laws had an inherent deterrent effect. 
 
62 Ariela Gross, The Law and the Culture of Slavery: Natchez, Mississippi 92-123.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 59 (1974).  
66 Id. at 60.  
67 Id. at 61 ( “[T]he slaveholding gentry were coerced as individuals by the popularly elected legislatures toward 
maintenance of a private tyranny which was conceived to be in the community interest. In the community at large, 
effective maintenance of slavery depended to considerable degree on vigilance and force, and colonial governments 
had at their direct command precious little force with which to be vigilant.”). 
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Notwithstanding many of the harsh laws calling for cruel punishment of runaway or rebel 
slaves, hegemony may also explain many of the more “paternalistic” laws of the day. Take, for 
instance, laws that imposed the obligation on masters to care for their old and ailing slaves. Laws 
of this nature served two hegemonic functions. Of course, the first was to confirm the nature of 
the relationship between slave and master: the slave was the master’s property and 
responsibility forever. The second function—to present an image of paternalism—stemmed from 
a recognition by the slaveholding class that establishing a paternalistic relationship with the slave 
class was essential to the efficacy and public perception of its hegemony over the South. As 
Eugene Genovese put it,  “[the law] must manifest a degree of evenhandedness sufficient to 
compel social conformity; it must, that is, validate itself ethically in the eyes of the several classes, 
not just the ruling class.”68 Consequently, if the slaveholding class was perceived as 
overwhelmingly cruel and vulgar in its treatment of slaves, the slave class as well as the non-
slaveholding White and free Black class would have rebelled against the institution.   
This notion of a “paternalistic hegemony” might similarly explain why slavery and slave 
resistance was much different in the United States than in other European colonies in the 
Caribbean and South America. The Southern slave masters did not face the same threat of 
insurrection and they had “little need for extralegal measures” against their slaves because the 
laws already established their roles.69 Thus, the American slave-owners were able to operate 
virtually unconcerned with rebellion. However, insurrections that gained traction—often led by 
charismatic leaders—were even more impactful because of how rare they were. That Nat Turner, 
for example, led a rebellion of over 60 armed slaves resulting in the deaths of over 50 White 
 
68 EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE  27.  
69 Id. 
 19 
people was incredibly jarring for the slaveholding class and non-slaveholding White class alike in 
areas with significant numbers of slaves. So jarring in fact that the local militia groups and mobs 
of Angry White men retaliated by beating and killing many slaves accused of participating in the 
rebellion. Nat Turner, of course, was executed by the State. Perhaps adding fuel to the fire was 
that Thomas Gray, the man who transcribed Nat Turner’s confession, seemingly took liberties in 
relaying Nat’s story.70 Presumably, Gray exaggerated Nat’s religiosity and the messiah-like vibe 
of the rebellion, used the word “murder” where Nat likely would not have, and portrayed the 
rebellion in a dramatically brutal and cold blooded manner.71 This was arguably done to portray 
slaves in general as presenting a much larger appetite for violent uprising than they did in 
actuality. By painting Nat Turner’s rebellion in such a manner, Gray created the false impression 
that slave insurrection was an omnipresent threat to White people in the South. Perhaps Gray 
did this simply for journalistic effect, but it is more likely that he was merely a cultural cog in the 
hegemonic machine. If slaves were seen as presenting such a grave threat, their continued 
enslavement would appear more justified to the public.  
On a similar note, that  lynching, violence against the Black community and prejudicial 
court proceedings arguably got worse after slavery also speaks to the reality that it was the 
slaveholding class’s hegemony that allowed for a “paternalistic” iteration of slavery in America. 
When the war ended and slavery was abolished, that power structure was seriously disrupted 
and the treatment of African Americans became more violent and aggressive as a consequence. 
In essence, racist Whites in America were compensating for their loss of control by ramping up 
their anger and hate. The Colfax massacre in 1873, for example, resulted in murder of 60 to 150 
 
70 The Confessions of Nat Turner, Edited with an Introduction by Kenneth S. Greenberg. 
71 Id.  
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African Americans. In the words of historian Eric Foner, “[it was] the bloodiest single instance of 
racial carnage in the Reconstruction era, the Colfax massacre taught many lessons, including the 
lengths to which some opponents of Reconstruction would go to regain their accustomed 
authority.”72 To be clear, there was indisputably abhorrent and morally repugnant mistreatment 
of slaves in the American South prior to the war. But, the point is that violence against African 
Americans ostensibly got more aggressive when the White ruling class’s control over Southern 
society was threatened. It is therefore doubtful that this “paternalistic” iteration of slavery in 
America would have occurred had the control of the slaveholding class not been so clearly 
delineated.   
Ultimately, the role of the law in a slave society is to allow the institution to thrive without 
the public developing a guilty conscience: “[the] law acts hegemonically to assure people that 
their particular consciences can be subordinated—indeed, morally must be subordinated—to the 
collective judgement of society.”73 If the law compels masters to punish runaway slaves, for 
example, it is unlikely that the master will feel some sense of immorality for doing what the law 
commands him to do.  Indeed, he may feel immoral for not doing it. By distinguishing the races 
in their status, rights, privileges and protections under the law, the state judges and legislators 
of the day sought to suppress doubt about the efficacy and morality of slavery in the minds of 
the many classes. Simply put, the law aimed to clearly delineate the roles of each class in society 
in a way that upheld slavery and its attendant power structure. Numerous examples of state 
explicitly uphold slavery, place the slave master on superior ground, and relegate slaves to the 
role of property. From laws that allow and even compel the master to discipline his slave to laws 
 
72 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (2011). Foner goes on to say: 
“Among blacks in Louisiana, the incident was long remembered as proof that in any large confrontation, they stood 
at a fatal disadvantage.” 
73EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 27-28.  
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that hold the master accountable for the actions of his slave, the entire corpus of law from the 
Southern slave states could be seen as serving the hegemonic end of reinforcing the illusion that 
White men were superior to Black men. As a consequence, White men in this country felt that 
they could own Black men as personal property without being immoral. The institution of slavery 
depended on this illusion, and the illusion was made possible by the law. The next section will 
consider how the federal law worked to sustain this illusion at a grand scale.  
 
The Original U.S. Constitution  
 
It is impossible to deny the duality implicit in the Constitution of 1787. It was simultaneously 
pro-freedom and pro-slavery. It contained a grand promise of opportunity, due process, and 
liberty for some, but a condemnation to undeserved subordinacy and oppression with no process 
for others. It was weaponized by slaveowners and racists to reinforce and sustain slavery while 
also weaponized by the brightest abolitionist minds of the day to derail the institution. Clearly, 
whether the Constitution was pro-slavery or pro-freedom in its effect depended on who was 
applying it and who it was being applied to. This section will first briefly discuss Edmund Morgan’s 
arguments about the correlation between American freedom and American slavery: the 
American paradox as he calls it. Then, Frederick Douglass and his arguments for an anti-slavery 
Constitution will be used as a framework for analyzing the most relevant provisions of the original 




The American Paradox 
Edmund Morgan’s contemplation of the American paradox eloquently captures the duality 
and contradiction of American values. Although he does not argue explicitly in constitutional 
terms, the contradiction and duality he notes as being prevalent in colonial America undeniably 
seeped into the Constitution of 1787. Morgan started with the observation that “the rise of 
liberty and equality in this country was accompanied by the rise of slavery.” He noted further,  
“[t]hat two such contradictory developments were taking place simultaneously over a long 
period of our history, from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth, is the central paradox of 
American history.”74 Morgan went on from here to make the nuanced point that slavery and 
freedom coevolved in colonial America. Furthermore, prevailing conceptions of freedom and 
liberty in American culture were, paradoxically, a direct consequence of slavery in that slavery 
inevitably incited an aggressive form of liberalism that is responsible for the staunch personal 
rights and liberties granted in documents like the Bill of Rights.75 It is perhaps no coincidence 
then that slavery and representative democracy arrived in Jamestown, Virginia in the same year, 
1619.76  Similarly, one could view the strong ideas of freedom, resistance and liberty developed 
by the African Americans subjected to slavery as another manifestation of this American paradox. 
“The challenge” for historians and legal scholars according to Morgan “is to explain how a people 
could have developed the dedication to human liberty and dignity exhibited by the leaders of the 
American Revolution and at the same time have developed and maintained a system of labor 
 
74 Edmund S. Morgan, Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox, 59 J. AM. HIST. 5, 6 (1972).  
75 Id. at 26 (“It was slavery, I suggest, more than any other single factor, that had made the difference, slavery that 
enabled Virginia to nourish representative government in a plantation society, slavery that transformed the Virginia 
of Governor Berkeley to the Virginia of Jefferson, slavery that made the Virginians dare to speak a political language 
that magnified the rights of freemen, and slavery, therefore, that brought Virginians into the same commonwealth 
political tradition with New Englanders. The very institution that was to divide North and South after the Revolution 
may have made possible their union in a republican government. Thus began the American paradox of slavery and 
freedom, intertwined and interdependent, the rights of Englishmen supported on the wrongs of Africans.”).  
76 Class  9/9/20 & 12/2/20 
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that denied human liberty and dignity every hour of the day.”77 The point of including this brief 
discussion on Morgan’s work here is threefold. First, it is significant to simply to note that the 
duality of American values and principles and the consequent inconsistent nature of the original 
Constitution had roots deep in American culture, dating back well before 1787. Second, as the 
following section will hopefully manifest, the Constitution is perhaps the best example, at least 
in document form, of this American paradox in action. Moreover, the Constitution is illustrative 
of the contradictory stances held by the founding fathers that Morgan consistently references in 
his work. Third, it is a fitting way to preface Douglass’s arguments as a framework for analyzing 
the Constitution in that his argument was itself representative of the American paradox. A free 
African-American abolitionist was effectively excusing the framers’ ambivalence toward slavery 
evident in the language of original Constitution.  
 
 
Frederick Douglass on Whether the Constitution was Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery 
 
At first blush, one might be struck with confusion or even frustration by some of 
Douglass’s arguments related to the original Constitution. How could such a brilliant man, and an 
abolitionist at that, not see the Constitution for what it was? Why would he go beyond the text 
to give the Constitution of 1787 an anti-slavery tinge? How could Douglass ignore the undeniable 
language that explicitly recognized the idea of “property in man”? After some deliberation, one’s 
 
77 Morgan, supra note 74, at 6; See also MARK TUSHNET, THE LAW OF SLAVERY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, in SLAVE 
LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 11-18 (“The drafters of the Constitution, meeting in Philadelphia, discovered that they 
would be unable to secure the Constitution's ratification if they allowed the Constitution to cast doubt on slavery. They 
avoided using the words slavery or slaves in the Constitution, but they included several provisions that recognized and 
even protected the institution where it existed.”).  
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irritation and confusion should fade as the realization dawns on them: Douglass made this 
argument because he had more foresight than his opponents who shared the same goal of 
abolition. What he was saying was this: if we allow the constitution to be labeled as pro-slavery 
then we allow it to be used as a mechanism for perpetuating slavery. Instead, as the argument 
goes, we need to make it look anti-slavery and pro-freedom so those in opposition to abolition 
will be forced to admit that slavery does not comport with the Constitution.78 In other words, we 
need to utilize the Constitution as a tool for ending slavery: weaponize it in the name of freedom, 
rather than letting it be weaponized in the name of slavery. Nonetheless, one might wonder if 
Douglass would stick to his argument today in a world where racial chattel slavery in America has 
been abolished with no chance of making a comeback as many of the problematic provisions 
have been rendered dead letter by amendments—mass incarceration notwithstanding. Would 
he still argue that the Constitution as written in 1787 was anti-slavery?  It is hard to believe that 
he would given his genius and the obvious error in his legal conclusions.  
For example, Douglass argued that Article 1, section 2, clause 379—the notorious three-
fifths clause—was actually anti-slavery and an intentional “disability” to slave states “by giving 
 
78 Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery? Speech Delivered in 
Glasgow, Scotland on March 26, 1860, in THE LIFE & WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 477 (“But how dare any 
man who pretends to be a friend to the Negro thus gratuitously concede away what the Negro has a right to claim 
under the constitution? Why should such friends invent new arguments to increase the hopelessness of his bondage? 
This, I undertake to say, as the conclusion of the whole matter, that the constitutionality of slavery can be made out 
only by disregarding the plain and common sense reading of the constitution itself; by discrediting and casting away 
as worthless the most beneficent of rules of legal interpretation; by ruling the Negro outside of these beneficent rules; 
by claiming everything for slavery; by denying everything for freedom; by assuming that the constitution does not 
mean what it says, and that it says what it does not mean; by disregarding the written constitution and interpreting it 
in light of a secret understanding. It is in this mean, contemptible, and underhand method that the American 
Constitution is pressed into the service of slavery.).” 
79 The clause reads: “Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be 
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole 
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three 
fifths of all other Persons.” 
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an increase of ‘two-fifths’ of political power to the free over slave states.”80  But, Douglass’s 
argument rests on a big assumption: the happening of an actual political movement in which this 
extra political power would be used to end slavery and promote freedom. Without the political 
will to end slavery, that extra political power does nothing more than give free states an 
advantage on issues totally unrelated to slavery. Thus, it might have the potential to be used as 
an anti-slavery tool, but it does not read as an intrinsically anti-slavery provision. To get there, 
one needs to read beyond the actual plain letter of the law. It must be conceded, however, that 
this particular provision similarly cannot be said to be intrinsically pro-slavery: the plain language 
of this clause neither facilitates slavery nor freedom.  Rather, it is an example of an instance 
where the Constitution—taken in its best light—is passively against slavery. Though, as historian 
Paul Finkelman has pointed out, this provision actually ended up protecting slavery in practice. 
Due to the massive amount of slaves in the South, counting them—even if only as three-fifths a 
person—actually meant more political power (more representatives) for slave states.81 
Douglass also discussed Article I, Section 9, clause, which is perhaps the most glaring 
example of the original Constitution being pro-slavery.82  Frankly, Douglass’s argument did not 
address this provision in a meaningful way.  Instead, he chose to focus on the portion about 
Congress’s right, or lack thereof, to prohibit the slave trade. The language of this provision 
unambiguously allows human trafficking and the slave trade to persist with clear language 
treating people as property. “Migration or Importation of such Persons,” for example, clearly 
 
80 Douglass, supra note 78, at 477. From here, Douglass goes on to say the following: “So much for the three-fifths 
clause; taking it at its worst, it still leans to freedom, not slavery; for, be it remembered that the constitution nowhere 
forbids a colored man to vote.”  
81 Paul Finkelman, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT 19 (2018).  
82 The clause reads: “The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper 
to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or 
duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”  
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reflects an idea of property in man.  Goods are imported, people are not—people emigrate and 
immigrate. Further, if that was not clear enough, it actually says that a tax can be imposed “on 
such importations.” Again, the language blatantly treats persons as imported goods, duty and all. 
As for the portion of the clause about Congress being prohibited from ending slavery until 1808,  
Douglass said that this language actually provides for the abolition of the slave trade and a means 
to end slavery.83 In fact, however, it says that the slave trade cannot be abolished before 1808, 
but it does not say—anywhere—that it must or will be abolished after that date. Although he 
may be right about that being the framers’ intention, the language lends itself to no such 
conclusion. Curiously, he also said that “it showed the intentions of the framers were good, not 
bad.”84 The framers’ intentions may well have been good, but this language certainly does not 
prove that. They gave the slave states a grace period where those states knew—with a virtual 
guarantee by the supreme law of the land—that the slave trade would persist uninterrupted until 
1808. It is also worth mentioning that even if construed as Douglass suggests, the slave trade 
could end without enslaved men being freed. Prohibiting the slave trade—which is not a 
guarantee after the twenty years by the clause’s own language—would be a way to let slavery 
slowly die, which appears to be more passive on slavery than anti-slavery.  
Significantly, Douglass also addressed Article  IV, section 2, clause 3, which is commonly 
referred to as the fugitive slave clause.85 Douglass argued that this provision did not apply to 
slaves at all and instead applied to indentured servants. His argument was essentially that, being  
 
83 Douglass, supra note 78 (“for it says to the slave states, the price you will have to pay for coming into the American 
Union is, that the slave trade, which you would carry on indefinitely out of the union, shall be put an end to in twenty 
years if you come into the union”).  
84 Id.  
85The clause reads: “No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, 
shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be 
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.” 
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“a simple article of property”  and not a person with personal rights, a slave cannot owe service.86 
There are many problems apparent with his analysis here. To start, the three-fifths clause refers 
explicitly to slaves as being persons, and although it only counts them as three-fifths a person, 
they are nonetheless a person for the purposes of the Constitution. Further, it does not read “no 
person held in service or labor for a term of years,” which would reasonably be read as applying 
to indentured servants only. Instead it reads “no person held in service or labor in one State,” 
which could easily be read as applying to both slaves and indentured servants. Also,  the framers 
had already shown in the three-fifths clause that they knew how to be much more explicit when 
referring specifically to indentured servants: “Including those bound to service for a term of 
years.” And, as we know, this is the principal distinction between what makes someone a slave 
versus an indentured servant. Why then would the framers, as brilliant and knowledgeable as 
they were, not be specific about indentured servants in this article? It is simple: they were not 
talking about indentured servants (or not solely about indentured servants), they were referring 
principally to slaves.  
To reiterate, Douglass made the arguments that he did because he recognized that the times 
demanded that the Constitution be given an anti-slavery and pro-freedom read so that it could 
be used as a tool to end slavery. After all, what could be more powerful a tool than the supreme 
law of the land.  Douglass likely also recognized that the best way to change the system was to 
change it from within. It would surely be a much taller task to abolish the whole Constitution 
than to abolish slavery as being inconsistent with the Constitution. However, even if Douglass 
and others were able to make some clever arguments that allowed abolitionists to weaponize it 
 
86 Douglass, supra note 78, at 475. Note the language used here. It is interesting that he would use this language when 
his whole argument is built on the notion that the Constitution does not recognize the idea of property in man.  
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against slavery, it seems clear in retrospect that the original language of Constitution was, 
regrettably, not anti-slavery. This also may have been required of the framers in that they would 
have been hard pressed to unify the country through the establishment of the Constitution had 
they been aggressively anti-slavery as the Southern states never would have ratified. Therefore, 
it may be that the framers made every effort to be anti-slavery and pro-freedom where they 
could, but the Constitution as a whole was, construed in its worst light, pro-slavery. Even in its 
best light—assuming that the framers did plan for some language to be used as a mechanism for 
ending slavery at some later date—these troubling provisions demonstrate that the Constitution 
was not, at its inception and in in its immediate effect, anti-slavery. To be an anti-slavery 
document, it would need a generous, perhaps even intellectually dishonest, interpretation. 
Nonetheless, Douglass’s point on the responsibility of judges and lawyers to use their interpretive 
capacities to fight against slavery is well-taken. As Douglass saw it, the law is what those tasked 
with interpreting it say it is.  
 
 
The Supreme Court’s Role in Maintaining Slavery 
Fittingly, the topic of judicial interpretation brings our discussion to the significance of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on slavery. Although none of the freedom suit cases heard by the 
Marshall Court that will be addressed here spoke directly to the Constitution, Marshall’s pro-
slavery opinions are worth examining as they set the stage for an unsettling trend of pretextual 
judicial restraint. Then, the focus will turn to Justice Story’s perturbing constitutional 
rationalization of slavery in Prigg v. Pennsylvania. Lastly, Chief Justice Taney’s racist rhetoric and 
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feigning of judicial restraint and the troubling implications of Dred Scott v. Sandford will be 
examined.  
Chief Justice Marshall & His Pro-Slavery Jurisprudence 
Despite his heroics for the Court, like establishing judicial review and Constitutional 
supremacy, Marshall’s relatively small line of cases relating to slavery have caused many to 
question the legal community’s widespread reverence for the Chief Justice that shaped the Court 
and American constitutional law. As was the case with Judge Ruffin, Marshall was a slaveholder 
in his personal capacity, and not a meager one at that.87 Marshall was also outspokenly against 
the idea of free Black people in American society, and he even petitioned the Virginia legislature 
to fund the removal of free Black people from the state.88 To what extent his personal views on 
slavery and race crept into his jurisprudence on the Court is not entirely clear, but it appears safe 
to say that they did to some degree. For example, every majority opinion issued by Marshall in a 
case involving a slave resulted in the slave losing.89 As Finkelman points out, what is more 
concerning is that Marshall, a famously courageous and creative Justice, often hid behind legal 
formalism and judicial conservativism in the slavery cases he heard by taking an 
 
87 Paul Finkelman, Master John Marshall and the Problem of Slavery, U. CHICAGO L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 31, 2020), 
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/08/31/marshall-slavery-pt1/ (“Marshall owned hundreds of slaves during 
his lifetime. He owned plantations and clearly profited from them. In 1830, five years before his death, he owned 
about 150 slaves. Had he not given a substantial number of slaves to his sons, Marshall would have owned more than 
250 slaves. Unlike his distant cousin Thomas Jefferson, Marshall did not inherit these slaves; rather, he bought them 
throughout his life. Furthermore, throughout his public career Marshall publicly and privately opposed the presence 
of free blacks in America. He petitioned the Virginia legislature to fund removing them from the state.”). 
88 Id.  
89 Id.(“The Marshall Court heard fourteen cases involving black freedom. The Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion 
in seven, and in every case the slaves lost. Justice William Johnson, of South Carolina, wrote the opinion rejecting 
freedom in one case in 1827. In six other cases, decided from 1829 to 1835—when Marshall no longer totally 
dominated the Court—other justices, including two southern slaveowners, wrote opinions upholding black freedom. 
That others wrote these opinions suggests Marshall did not agree with the results. But, in an era when dissents were 
rare—Marshall only wrote six dissents in his lifetime—the chief justice’s silence is deafening. Given the nineteenth-
century Court’s limited jurisdiction and the cost and difficulty of appealing to the Court, especially for a slave, we 
might conclude that fourteen was actually a large number of cases. But whether “relatively few” or ‘relatively many,’ 
the outcome of these cases is striking: Chief Justice Marshall never wrote an opinion supporting black freedom.”).  
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uncharacteristically strict and narrow approach to judicial interpretation.90 Yet, when “statutes 
and precedent were on the side of freedom,” Marshall would still issue decisions supporting the 
institution of slavery.91 Thus, his jurisprudence in slavery related cases can be characterized as 
altogether legally inconsistent: conveniently adhering to the operative text and precedent when 
it supported slavery, but ignoring or straining the operative text and precedent when it hindered 
slavery. The constitutional significance of Marshall’s decisions may not be immediately clear with 
the absence of direct constitutional challenges to slavery, but in retrospect one could arguably 
view the Marshall Court’s pro-slavery opinions—particularly those actually authored by 
Marshall—as laying the groundwork for the Court’s inevitable constitutional jurisprudence on 
the matter in later cases like Prigg and Dred Scott.  Of course the holdings in many of the Marshall 
Court’s slavery cases are troubling, but the ad-hoc application of legal formalism and the feigning 
of judicial restraint to either defend slavery or avoid questions about its legitimacy is equally, if 
not more, disconcerting.  
Take, for example, the case in which Marshall denied a woman claiming her freedom 
based on ancestry from presenting affidavits proving her great-grandmother’s freedom.92 
Despite being made aware of state practices suggesting that such evidence was generally 
admissible in similar contexts,93 Chief Justice Marshall took an unreasonably strict view of the 
hearsay rule and denied the plaintiff her freedom.94 In contrast, he hypocritically upheld the trial 
court’s decision to admit the hearsay evidence offered by the White man claiming to own the 
 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Mima Queen and Child v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. 290 (1813). 
93 Id. at 299 (Duvall, J., dissenting). To his credit, Justice Duvall would stand in opposition to slavery on a consistent 
basis while on the Marshall Court. See e.g., Wood v. Davis, 11 U.S. 271 (1812); Le Grand v. Darnall, 27 U.S. 664 
(1829).   
94 Mima Queen, 11 U.S. at 295.  
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plaintiff that suggested that the plaintiff’s mother was a slave. 95 In that same case, Marshall hid 
behind a strict application of the law in denying the removal of a juror that the plaintiffs objected 
to on the grounds that their objection was not made prior to the juror being sworn in.96  To make 
matters worse, Marshall upheld the trial court’s removal of an anti-slavery juror noting that “it 
was desirable to submit the case to those who felt no bias either way; and therefore the Court 
exercised a sound discretion in not permitting him to be sworn.”97 Yet, pro-slavery jurors were 
allowed to serve. Moreover, this decision had a pernicious effect in practice well beyond its 
damning impact on the plaintiff in that case. As Justice Gabriel Duvall noted in dissent: “a decision 
that hearsay evidence in such cases shall not be admitted, cuts up by the roots all claims of the 
kind, and puts a final end to them, unless the claim should arise from a fact of recent date, and 
such a case will seldom, perhaps never, occur.”98 The most bewildering part may be that Chief 
Justice Marshall ignored the settled law from Southern slave states while purporting to adhere 
strictly to the law.99 He would have been far from the first judge to admit such evidence in a case 
of this kind.100 Marshall could have easily settled this case in favor of the plaintiff without 
disturbing the law of Southern states and principles of federalism or threatening the state of the 
union. That case is but one example in a series of anti-Black freedom decisions by Marshall. 
Although his rhetoric may not have been as racially charged as Taney’s in Dred Scott, his opinions 
demonstrate a firm commitment to upholding slavery and oppressing Black Americans. 
Consistent with the example set by the Chief Justice, the Court would proceed to hide behind 
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legal formalism and judicial restraint while issuing legally inconsistent opinions riddled with 
sinister racist undertones for over a century. Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott, for example, was in 
effect the antithesis of legal formalism and judicial conservatism, but his rhetoric appealed to 
those principles—as well as racist ones.101 Similarly, although Justice Story’s rhetoric was less 
disturbing, his formalistic constitutional justification for slavery and deference to the status quo 
in Prigg was equally concerning.  
Prigg v. Pennsylvania 
Prigg could be viewed as a paradigm shifting case that set the stage for the legal battle over 
abolition in the courts that was inextricably connected to the happening of the Civil War. It was 
paradigm shifting in that it unintentionally provided abolitionist lawyers with a new kind of legal 
challenge to slavery. But, that positive consequence came in a formalistic opinion by Justice Story 
that detailed a disconcerting constitutional justification for the efficacy of slavery. The holding in 
Prigg made it unequivocally clear that the Constitution as originally written was pro-slavery. 
Admittedly, some might argue that, while it did render the Constitution pro-slavery, this case 
instead bolsters the argument that it was the racist judges and lawyers of the day that gave the 
Constitution it’s pro-slavery tinge, rather than the text itself. Although, the analysis of the 
Constitution and Frederick Douglass above arguably reveals otherwise. But, even if that point is 
conceded, it is a distinction without a difference. As Douglass taught us, the meaning of a law is 
largely (if not solely) determined by what those tasked with interpreting it perceive it to mean. 
In this case, the body with ultimate authority on interpreting the Constitution posed a textual 
argument stating that a provision of the Constitution was unambiguously a fugitive slave clause 
 
101 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857). 
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that prevents runaway slaves from escaping into non-slaveholding states.102 Regardless of 
whether it is the inherent meaning of the text or simply the Court’s interpretation of it that 
renders it so, this cases makes it clear that the Constitution was a pro-slavery document in 
practice. Thus, the Constitution was effectively a tool in the anti-abolitionists toolbox.  
The holding—that a Pennsylvania law allowing fugitive slaves refuge from slavery 
contravened Article IV and was thus unconstitutional—was significant in its own right as it made 
any state law contravening the fugitive slave clause or the subsequent fugitive slave act 
unconstitutional. Thus, runaway slaves were left with no recourse or right to due process if 
caught and forced back into slavery. What is worse, the state law at issue in this case was actually 
meant to protect free African Americans from being sold into slavery. Thus, as discussed in an 
article by Professor Newmyer and Professor Lahav, Story’s opinion goes further than just 
damaging runaway slaves. The holding, like many other decisions and laws that upheld slavery, 
threatened the rights of all African Americans living in the country, free or slave.103  However, 
the way Story framed the issue contextually—that the success of the union was ultimately 
dependent on this clause’s existence and continued efficacy—makes that holding even more 
troubling in that it painted slavery in the image of this immovable object in the American South. 
104 That is, immovable to the extent that one wants to keep the union intact. Story makes it clear 
to the nation as a whole that the slave owners’ right to own slaves would—as per the 
Constitution—take precedent over the peoples’ moral objections to the institution of slavery. It 
 
102 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 611 (1842).  
103 Alexandra D. Lahav and R. Kent Newmyer, The Law Wars of Massachusetts, 1830-1860: How a Band of Upstart 
Radical Lawyers Defeated the Forces of Law and Order, and Struck a Blow For Freedom and Equality Under Law, 
58 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.  324, 335 (2018).   
104 As Justice Story framed it, “the object of this clause was to secure to the citizens of the slave-holding states the 
complete right and title of ownership in their slaves, as property, in every state in the Union into which they might 
escape from the state where they were held in servitude.” Id.  
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effectively says that, even when a slave has found refuge in a free state that has affirmatively 
condemned slavery in its own laws, the master’s right to the slave’s labor will always prevail and 
that fugitive slave will be forced back into slavery without due process of law. Notably, Story took 
a page out of Chief Justice Marshall’s playbook and used language alluding to judicial restraint 
and legal formalism to justify his narrow reading of the Constitution:  
[I]t may be well, in order to clear the case of difficulty, to say, that in the 
exposition of this part of the constitution, we shall limit ourselves to those 
considerations which appropriately and exclusively belong to it, without laying 
down any rules of interpretation of a more general nature.105 
 
Story also consistently referred to textualist principles—tools of legal formalism and judicial 
restraint—as he upheld slavery and defended its efficacy.106 As alluded to earlier in this 
subsection, however, this case had some unintended positive consequences. In essence, the 
infringement on federalism implicit in this decision caused a paradigm shift to the way in which 
abolitionist lawyers approached their cases: radical lawyers in free states were now inclined to 
use principles of due process under state law to challenge pro-slavery federal laws.107 The radical 
bar in Massachusetts, for example, wasted no time in exploiting Story’s reasoning and using it 
against slavery. Prigg effectively motivated anti-slavery, pro-freedom lawyers and set the legal 
battle for abolition on an unstoppable track by unknowingly providing a strong legal framework 
for those lawyers to build their cases upon. Inevitably, this unstoppable force (the radical bar’s 
 
105 Id. at 610.  
106 See e.g., Id. at 612 (“How, then, are we to interpret the language of the clause? The true answer is, in such a manner 
as, consistently with the words, shall fully and completely effectuate the whole objects of it. If, by one mode of 
interpretation, the right must become shadowy and unsubstantial, and without any remedial power adequate to the 
end, and by another mode, it will attain its just end and secure its manifest purpose, it would seem, upon principles of 
reasoning, absolutely irresistible, that the latter ought to prevail. No court of justice can be authorized so to construe 
any clause of the constitution as to defeat its obvious ends, when another construction, equally accordant with the 
words and sense thereof, will enforce and protect them.”). 
107Alexandra D. Lahav and R. Kent Newmyer, supra note 103, at 338 (“In short, Prigg and Latimer gave 
the radical lawyers a legal vocabulary beyond the injustice of rendition and the immorality of slavery with which to 
argue their position: now the issue was the right to due process of law and trial by jury, as those rights were embodied 
in Massachusetts law. Radicalism had begun to don the mantle of law and order.”).  
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commitment to eroding and ending slavery) would collide with the immovable object (the 
institution of slavery in the American South).   
Dred Scott v. Sandford 
To reiterate, the impact that judges and elected officials had on slavery at the federal level 
leading up to the Dred Scott case was overwhelmingly one of reinforcement and accommodation. 
As illustrated, this was frequently done through patently racist and poorly reasoned decisions 
and misguided legislation. But, it was at times a more subtle product of a squandered opportunity 
or a passing of the buck. The context surrounding the Dred case, the Court’s decision, and the 
subsequent Lincoln-Douglas debates stand as examples of both the subtle and the blatant 
failures of Congress and the Court in defending freedom during the era of slavery. Congress 
kicked the can down the road to the Court with respect to the issue of slavery,108 and the Court 
squandered the opportunity to uphold freedom. Instead, Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion 
continued the Court’s disturbing trend of appealing to legal formalism to uphold slavery and hide 
behind the law. Although, to be sure, Taney’s façade was by far the most transparent. 
Unsurprisingly, Taney—like others on the Dred Scott Court—owned slaves in his personal 
capacity.109 Even more unsurprising, Taney was a staunch racist and believer in White supremacy, 
as evidenced by his grotesque rhetoric in this case.110 He constantly referred to Black people as 
 
108 Paul Finkelman, Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided Speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1858, in DRED SCOTT 
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109 Id. at 24.  
110  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 409 (1857) (“We give both of these laws in the words used by the respective 
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an “inferior,” “unfortunate,” “unhappy,” or “subordinate” race, and he referred to White people 
as the “dominant” race.111  
The racist rhetoric was despicable without doubt, but, again, it was also troubling that Taney 
feigned judicial restraint while simultaneously creating new law and limiting congressional 
power.112 For example, Taney used language like, “[i]t is not the province of the Court to decide 
upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question 
belonged to the political or law-making power. . . .”113 Yet, his opinion was doing exactly that. 
That is, deciding upon the policy or impolicy of Congress’s past decisions and Missouri State law; 
namely, the Missouri Compromise and the Missouri citizenship requirements. In familiar fashion, 
Taney purported to take a textual approach in suggesting that Congress’s right to regulate the 
territories of the United States under Article IV, section 3, clause 4 of the Constitution only 
applied to the territories in the Union at the time of the Constitution’s enactment.114 It should be 
obvious that such an argument is logically and legally inconsistent with most understandings of 
Congress’s power under the Constitution—textual and contextual based interpretations alike. It 
is simply an incoherent argument to suggest that this power of Congress to regulate, which is in 
a section addressing Congress’s power to make new states, is limited to old states and territories. 
It would effectively render an explicit power of Congress toothless in the new territories that 
likely most needed congressional assistance.  
 
111 Id. at 405; 407; 409; 412; 417; 426.  
112 Id. at 405. (“It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of 
these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-making power; to those who formed the 
sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with 
the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent and meaning 
when it was adopted.”) 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 432.  
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Worse still, he did not need to offer such a broad constitutional holding on Congress’s power 
to regulate slavery in the new territories to uphold the decision against Scott. Dred Scott lost the 
case in the lower courts pursuant to Missouri Law, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act—an act that 
made slavery a state by state question dependent on popular sovereignty which was chiefly 
sponsored by Senator Stephen Douglas—effectively repealed the Missouri Compromise three 
years earlier. Taney simply could have upheld the lower court’s ruling under Missouri Law and 
deemed the Missouri Compromise void by the Kansas-Nebraska act. It would not be a stretch to 
suggest that most judges and jurists would consider a broad constitutional holding to be the 
antithesis of judicial conservativism, especially when not needed to reach the desired conclusion. 
So much, then, for Taney’s self-proclaimed judicial restraint. To be clear, it still would have been 
a troubling pro-slavery decision had he decided the case against Dredd by other means,  but at 
least it would have been consistent with a theory of judicial conservativism. The same charges of 
pretextual judicial conservativism and extreme legal formalism  could be cast at Taney for the 
more well-known holding in that case regarding African American citizenship. Taney ruled that 
African Americans—whether currently slaves or the descendants of slaves—were not considered 
citizens of the United States and thus not entitled to the rights and protections of the 
Constitution.115 Taney acted as though he was simply applying the law, but his convoluted 
reasoning on this issue blatantly exposes his façade. He was not being conservative or restrained 
by any definition as the citizenship question was not even an issue in front of the Court. The lower 
courts decided that Scott was a citizen under Missouri law while also holding that he was a slave. 
Dred Scott certainly did not appeal the lower court’s decision on his citizenship; rather, he 
appealed the court’s decision as to his status a slave.  
 
115 Id. at 407.  
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Taney consistently grounded his pro-slavery arguments in in unreasonably originalist 
arguments about the framers’ ideologies and personal lives. For example, he made the 
convoluted argument that, because the framer’s owned slaves and were ambivalent about 
slavery, it is unlikely that they would have included African American’s in their definition of 
citizenship—even when freed. Taney was indeed hiding behind the law under false pretenses, 
but he was doing it quite conspicuously. As Finkelman put it quite succinctly: 
Taney’s opinion illustrates the folly of using an intentionalist analysis when the 
intentions of the framers were clearly mixed, uncertain, and contradictory. Taney 
offered an unsophisticated historical claim that was a thinly disguised political 
argument designed to destroy the republican party and any opposition to the 
spread of slavery into the territories.116 
 
Taney’s disturbing portrayal of American values taken together with the holdings of the case also 
serve as a stark demonstration of the truly exclusive nature of American law and culture at that 
time:  
It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at 
the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognized as citizens in the several 
States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was 
formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. . . .It was 
the union of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate 
political communities into one political family. . . .117 
 
It is language such as this that takes this case into its own class of repugnancy. A pro-slavery 
decision that denied Dred Scott his freedom was bad enough, but to go as far as Taney went was 
a needless atrocity unmatched in its moral reprehensibility as far as this writer is concerned. 
Consider, in sharp contrast, the alternatives that the Court had. Of course, reversing the lower 
court’s decision regarding slavery and affirmatively holding that Congress had the right to ban 
 
116 PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT  (2018). 
117 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406. 
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slavery in the Union would have been the most preferrable. Unfortunately, that decision was 
unlikely to happen given the Court’s makeup. More realistically, Justice McLean suggested that 
the Court take an approach more consistent with federalism that would have also freed Dred 
Scott.118 While respecting state rights and preserving Congress’s right to regulate new territories, 
he argued that Congress had the authority to establish and regulate the internal affairs of a 
territory such as Wisconsin.119 
Justice Curtis’s dissent, however, offered the more powerful repudiation of Taney’s 
decision. It also painted a more compelling picture of an alternative path for the Court to take. 
Of course, he dissented vehemently on the citizenship question and stressed that all people born 
and naturalized in any of the individual states are citizens of this country.120 On the question of 
Congress’s authority, Curtis personally thought that Congress had the power to ban slavery in the 
states, but—taking a genuinely textual and conservative approach—he recognized that it was a 
political question of principle requiring immense resources.121 Thus, according to Curtis, it was 
not for the Court to decide.  Although either of these courses of action outlined by the dissenting 
justices would have been much preferred to Taney’s decision, neither would have done enough 
to settle the issue of slavery in America.  The significance of Curtis’s dissent, however, was that 
it manifested that the “road not taken” was the road that Taney purported he was on; that is, 
the road of judicial restraint.122 
 
118 Id. at 529 (McLean, J., dissenting).  
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122 Keith E. Whittington, The Road Not Taken: Dred Scott, Judicial Authority, and Political Questions, 63 Journal of 
Politics 365, 381 (2001) (“The virtue of Curtis's opinion lies not only in his careful refutation of Taney's citizenship 
argument, but also in his surprisingly Jeffersonian suggestion that political actors bore responsibility for working 
through the principles at stake for themselves and that the judiciary could not spare them that responsibility.”).  
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The debates over the legitimacy of the Court and the issue of Slavery between Abraham 
Lincoln and Stephen Douglas that ensued after this case reflect the widespread dissatisfaction 
regarding the Court’s decision and the status of slavery in the union. According to Douglas, 
slavery had to be a question decided by the states under principles of popular sovereignty.  
Though, whether he was actually indifferent to Slavery as he presumes to be was seriously 
questionable to Lincoln.123 To that end, perhaps Douglas argued for a theory of popular 
sovereignty because it was clear that slavery would be supported by such a theory if applied in 
the South. Either way, popular sovereignty was exactly what Congress contrived in 1854 with the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act authored by Senator Douglas himself.124 As Lincoln frames it, however, this 
was an inherently unsustainable plan for a unified country.  
“A house divided against itself cannot stand.” I believe this government cannot 
endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be 
dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be 
divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other.125 
 
This sentiment of untenable turbulence and tension expressed by Lincoln was well-founded. 
Obviously, the country went to war over slavery within a few years of the famous debates, but a 
mini-civil war had already been happening in Kansas. In response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
from 1854-1849, there was a series of violent confrontations in the Kansas territory as a 
consequence of the rising political tensions surrounding the slavery debate in the territory. It was 
essentially a one-state civil war over slavery, commonly referred to as ‘bleeding Kansas,’ that 
foreshadowed what was to come for the rest of this country.  
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It seems fitting to juxtapose the brief discussion on Lincoln with the brief point that the 
Supreme Court cases focused on here—Dred Scott and Prigg—also set the stage for what the end 
to slavery, beyond a civil war of course, would have to look like: a constitutional amendment. 
The Constitution was pro-slavery according to the Supreme Court. Thus, amending the 
Constitution after the war to make it anti-slavery would be the only way to officially end the 
institution without throwing out the baby (the Constitution as a whole) with the bathwater (the 
parts of it that were pro-slavery or anti-freedom).  
These cases and laws demonstrate the duality of American law and culture in a jarring way. 
This is the cruel and exclusive nature of the American legal system that Frederick Douglass was 
alluding to when he said “their laws, their judges, their representatives and legislators.”126 Worse 
still, this trend would not end with slavery.    
Closing Remarks: The Long-Lasting Implications of the Law’s Approach to Race in America 
Despite all the nuanced duality noted in the laws, there is one example of duality that 
stands out above all else. To reiterate, that is the duality of what it meant, and now means, to be 
an American. For many Black people in the country during the time of slavery, it meant a life of 
forced labor, gross mistreatment, unsolicited racism, and an utter lack of rights, liberty and 
opportunity. Consequently, what it means to be an American today in 2020 is, for many, a long 
ancestral history of being oppressed and abused by one’s own government and neighbors. For 
many, it also means facing pervasive prejudice on a daily basis in a variety of ugly forms—each 
one more backhanded than the last.  Including, to be clear, being subjected to the conscious and 
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subconscious biases of those responsible for the drafting, interpretation, and enforcement of the 
law.  
It is fair to say that American law has failed the Black community consistently from 1619 
through 2020. When slavery ended and African Americans had seemingly gained legitimate rights 
and liberties, the Court destroyed the civil rights amendments and continued its long-standing 
tradition of hiding behind the law when faced with issues concerning racism in America. In the 
Slaughter House Cases, the Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment only prohibits chattel 
slavery as experienced by African Americans before the war.127 In that same decision,  the Court 
also held that the privileges and immunities clause of Fourteenth Amendment only protects 
rights guaranteed by the United States and not rights guaranteed by the states.128 About a decade 
later, the Court again offered a narrow reading of the Constitution and held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protections against discrimination only allowed Congress to prohibit 
discrimination by state actors under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.129 Perhaps worst of all, however, 
was the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson case in which the Court held that racially segregated public 
accommodations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause provided that they are “separate but 
equal.”130 Although, it is worth noting that Justice Harlan’s dissent in that case—despite 
expressing his personal racist, White supremacy sentiments—is the genesis of the color-blind 
Constitution theory.131  At the state level, Jim Crow laws and segregation took root immediately 
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after the war and continued the abhorrent treatment and calculated oppression of Black people 
in this country for nearly a century. Worse still, racially charged violence against Black Americans 
from the public at large seemingly increased after the war ended and slavery was abolished 
because the power structure was rattled.  
Today, there remains disparate impact, enforcement and application of the law—
including police brutality, racial profiling, significant differences in sentencing, and 
disproportionate enforcement of non-violent drug laws tied to mass incarceration. Of course, 
this also translates into prejudices in social and professional settings. Most appalling, however, 
is the largely unaddressed issue of generational poverty caused as a consequence of Slavery and 
all its vestiges—such as, mass incarceration and discrimination in housing, voting,  education and 
the work place—that has plagued so many Black communities. Suffice it to say, racism is 
America’s original sin and anti-Black racism is its worst iteration, slavery is just the most patently 
reprehensible manifestation of that sin. 
 As these practices and historical facts continue to go unaddressed or underappreciated, 
the dual nature of what it means to be an America will persist.  Racism and slavery are often 
thought of and taught as being dark parts of history that do not represent who we are as 
Americans, which may be true in some ways. It is indeed a dark and regrettable part of history, 
but it is our history and it’s still plaguing us in 2020—we ought to reckon with that reality. It ought 
to be mentioned that the founding fathers were, at best, ambivalent about slavery when framing 
the Constitution every time the founding of this country is discussed. That the Supreme Court of 
the United States has a reproachable history of pro-slavey and other racially-driven jurisprudence 
should be common knowledge. Frederick Douglass should not only be discussed as a great African 
American thinker and historical figure, but rather should be recognized as a great American 
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thinker and figure. His unparalleled foresight and brilliance ought to be discussed concurrently 
with the most revered American legal thinkers and writers of his day—the anti-slavery ones and 
pro-slavery ones alike—with each in their proper place.  Of course, examining our past as a 
historian or legal scholar requires an honest recognition of the duality of our culture and law. 
But, that being said, one cannot separate slavery, racism and the struggles and achievements of 
Black Americans from the rest of American history. Again, American history is one story. A story 
with duality, abhorrent racial distinctions, and bewildering contradictions no doubt, but a single 
story nonetheless. John Marshall, Frederick Douglass, Joseph Story, Dred Scott, Abraham Lincoln, 
Celia, and Nat Turner are all part of that same American story. It is time we start telling it that 
way.  
 
 
 
 
